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Abstract
Intermediaries can choose between functioning as a marketplace (on which suppliers sell their
products directly to buyers) or as a reseller (purchasing products from suppliers and selling them to
buyers). We model this as a decision between whether control rights over a non-contractible deci-
sion variable (the choice of some marketing activity) are better held by suppliers (the marketplace-
mode) or by the intermediary (the reseller-mode). Whether the marketplace or the reseller mode is
preferred depends on whether independent suppliers or the intermediary have more important infor-
mation relevant to the optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specific product. We show
that this tradeoff is shifted towards the reseller-mode when marketing activities create spillovers
across products and when network effects lead to unfavorable expectations about supplier partic-
ipation. If the reseller has a variable cost advantage (respectively, disadvantage) relative to the
marketplace then the tradeoff is shifted towards the marketplace for long-tail (respectively, short-
tail) products. We thus provide a theory of which products an intermediary should offer in each
mode. We also provide some empirical evidence that supports our main results.
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1 Introduction
Retailers like 7-Eleven, Eastbay.com, Lowes and Zappos.com act as intermediaries by reselling the
products they purchase from suppliers to buyers. Other intermediaries, such as Alibaba.com, eBay.com,
Premium Outlets, and Simon Malls act as marketplaces, in which suppliers sell directly to buyers via a
platform. In the existing literature, the intermediation model — reseller or marketplace — is taken as
given. It is important to recognize, however, that intermediaries can often choose under which mode
to operate.
For example, most electronics retailers function as resellers. They take ownership and control
over products from branded suppliers and choose how to sell them in their stores (layout, pricing,
promotions, emphasis, etc.). Recently, however, the largest such retailer in the United States, Best
Buy, has taken a step towards the marketplace mode by allowing Apple, Samsung and Microsoft to
launch their own mini-stores within Best Buy stores (Apple in 2011, Microsoft and Samsung in 2013).
These brands control the product layout in these mini-stores, staff them with their own product
specialists and Samsung even offers its own checkout service.1 Similarly, Buy.com was founded in 1997
as a pure online reseller, but starting in 2006 it aggressively expanded its marketplace offering. By
2010, when it was acquired by Rakuten, Japan’s largest online shopping mall, Buy.com was a hybrid,
with sales roughly evenly distributed between the reseller and the marketplace modes.2 In 2013, it was
rebranded Rakuten.com Shopping and was reportedly moving towards a 100% marketplace mode.3 An
example of a transition in the opposite direction is provided by Zappos.com, the leading online shoe
retailer in the U.S., which started off in 1999 as a marketplace, before turning itself into a pure reseller
by the mid-2000s, prior to its 2009 acquisition by Amazon. Other examples where intermediaries make
such choices include: department stores (resellers for some product categories and marketplaces for
others, most notably cosmetics, where branded suppliers control independent counters); Amazon.com
(started off as a pure reseller but now operates as a marketplace as well); digital content intermediaries
(e.g. Comcast, DirecTV, Apple’s iTunes and Netflix operate as resellers, whereas Apple’s iPhone App
Store and Google Play operate mostly as marketplaces).
This paper analyzes the choice facing an intermediary between operating as a marketplace, as a
reseller, or as a hybrid, having some products offered under each of the two different modes. What
are the trade-offs that drive an intermediary to adopt one mode over the other, or both? We present
1See “Best Buy to Carve Out Microsoft Mini-Stores,” by Shira Ovide and Ann Zimmerman, 13 June 2013, The Wall
Street Journal ; “Samsung Sets Up Boutique in Best Buy; Electronics Retailer Will Have Dedicated Boutique for When
Galaxy S4 Debuts,” by Ann Zimmerman, 4 April 2013, The Wall Street Journal.
2Geoffrey A. Fowler and Daisuke Wakabayashi ”Japan’s Rakuten to Acquire Buy.com,” Wall Street Journal, 21 May
2010.
3http://dealnews.com/features/Buy.com-to-Become-a-Marketplace-only-Site-Hopes-to-Take-on-
Amazon/661313.html
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a formal model for analyzing some of the fundamental tradeoffs that arise in comparing resellers with
marketplaces, and determining which products to offer under each mode.
We take the view that a fundamental distinction between marketplaces and resellers is the al-
location of control rights between independent suppliers and the intermediary over non-contractible
decisions (prices, advertising, customer service, responsibility for order fulfillment, etc.) pertaining to
the products being sold. In the case of a pure marketplace, all of these residual control rights rest
with independent suppliers. In the case of a pure reseller, all residual control rights rest with the
intermediary (i.e. the reseller).
In our model, we focus on a single, non-contractible decision variable, which can be interpreted
as the choice of some marketing activity that occurs through this particular intermediary and that is
undertaken by the party holding residual control rights (i.e. the reseller, or each independent supplier
in the case of a marketplace). Examples of such an activity include the way in which a product is
displayed, or the extent to which its brand is promoted relative to its features (e.g. through in-store
signage or sales staff). The intermediary and the suppliers each have private information about the
ideal choice of the marketing activity. Drivers of the optimal intermediation mode that we analyze
include the relative importance of the suppliers’ versus the intermediary’s private information, the
presence of spillovers across products generated by marketing activities, whether products are long-
tail or short-tail, and a possible chicken-and-egg problem faced by the marketplace when suppliers hold
unfavorable expectations about other suppliers’ participation on the marketplace. We also establish
conditions under which a hybrid mode is optimal and characterize its optimal design in such cases. Our
article thus offers a guide to how intermediaries should optimally position themselves between the two
different modes. Finally, we offer some empirical evidence that corroborates our model’s predictions.
1.1 Literature review
The marketplaces we study are a type of multi-sided platform (or two-sided market). Multi-sided
platforms are organizations that get two or more sides on board and enable direct interactions between
them. In the case of marketplaces, the two sides are buyers and sellers, and the interaction is the
commercial trade between them. Thus, our framework does not fit all types of multi-sided platforms.
For instance, when the two sides are not trading a “product” that can be purchased and resold,
the choice to become a reseller does not arise (e.g. a nightclub). Nevertheless, marketplaces are an
important subclass of multi-sided platforms.
Our contribution to the literature on multi-sided platforms departs from the seminal models in the
two-sided market literature (e.g. Armstrong 2006, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Parker and Van Alstyne
2005, Rochet and Tirole 2003) by focusing on the role of non-contractible decisions and whether the
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intermediary or the third-party suppliers have control rights over these decisions — a novelty in this
literature. An important corollary of our modelling is that the specification of residual control rights
helps distinguish multi-sided platforms from resellers. Specifically, residual control rights remain with
sellers in the case of multi-sided platforms. The existing literature on two-sided markets has struggled
with this issue. According to some existing definitions, grocery stores are examples of multi-sided
platforms even though many economists think they are not (e.g. Rochet and Tirole 2006, and Rysman
2009). At the same time, we extend the existing literature by considering multi-sidedness as a choice
rather than as a given characteristic of industries or firms. Thus, our work is related to recent efforts
to expand the formal study of strategic decisions made by platforms beyond pricing (see, for example,
Nocke et al. 2007, Gawer and Henderson 2007, Gawer and Cusumano 2008, Boudreau 2010, Eisenmann
et al. 2011, Hagiu and Jullien 2011, Parker and Van Alstyne 2012, Gawer and Phillips 2013).
The importance of the strategic choice between marketplaces and resellers, and some of the tradeoffs
that can arise are discussed in Hagiu (2007) and Hagiu and Wright (2011, 2013). This paper formalizes
a framework in which the allocation of residual control rights creates meaningful distinctions between
the two modes, and emphasizes fundamental tradeoffs that were not raised in these earlier works. Note
that our focus is on control rights and not on the specific mechanisms through which a marketplace
or a reseller reduce buyer and seller search and transaction costs (such as in, Bakos, 1997). The
distinction between the marketplace and reseller modes of intermediation is also present in Hagiu and
Lee (2011). Their set-up features two downstream intermediaries who first compete for the affiliation
of one upstream supplier and then compete for customers (buyers). However, in their analysis the
mode of intermediation (marketplace or reseller) for the two downstream firms is exogenously given.
The focus of their analysis is the effect of intermediation model on the likelihood that the upstream
supplier deals exclusively with one intermediary as opposed to both.
By equating the difference between marketplaces and resellers to the allocation of residual control
rights between independent suppliers and the intermediary, our work is loosely related to the volu-
minous literature on vertical integration and the theory of the firm (see, for example, Grossman and
Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990 and Williamson 1975). However, rather than studying “make or buy
”decisions, we study “enable or resell ”decisions, which involve quite a different economic analysis.
The key difference is the following. In the “make or buy ”(vertical integration) decision, regardless of
the choice, the focal firm contracts with and controls the sale to buyers. By contrast, in the “market-
place or re-seller ”decision, the marketplace mode involves contractual relationships between buyers
and suppliers, to which the focal firm (intermediary) is not a party – it is merely an enabler of those
contractual relationships. Consequently, the specific tradeoffs are different. In particular, consider
contractual incompleteness. When complete contracts are infeasible, vertical integration (equivalent
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to the allocation of residual control rights) is driven by the need to minimize hold-up risk by (or of)
some suppliers, because hold-up risk tends to lead to sub-optimal relationship-specific investments
(Grossman and Hart 1986). This issue is not very relevant for the “marketplace or re-seller ”decision
since the hold-up by (or of) a supplier remains a risk whether the intermediary is a marketplace or a
reseller. Conversely, the contractual incompleteness in our model relates to non-contractible actions
which must be made contingent on information that is revealed after the intermediary contracts with
suppliers and before the products are sold to buyers. This issue has little if any relevance to “make
or buy ”decisions.
More closely related to our paper is a literature on organizational design which explores whether
centralized or decentralized decision-making is better. At a high level, we share with this literature the
focus on non-contractible decisions (ex-ante and ex-post) and on the tradeoffs that arise from allocating
the relevant decision rights to different parties. Loosely speaking, centralization corresponds to our
reseller mode and decentralization corresponds to our marketplace mode. See, for example, Alonso et
al. (2008, 2013), although their focus on strategic communication (their 2008 paper) and the tradeoff
between information breadth and depth (in their 2013 paper) is very different from ours.
Finally, our work relates to the recent work by Gans (2012), Foros et al. (2013) and Johnson (2013a
and b) that analyzes the agency model (suppliers set prices and share revenues with downstream
retailers) and contrasts it with the traditional wholesale model (suppliers set wholesale prices and
retailers set retail prices). These articles explore the implications of specific contract forms that have
recently emerged in the selling of digital content (e.g. application stores and e-books). Our article
complements this emerging literature given that contract forms are largely neutral in our analysis —
we instead focus on the role of private information and non-contractible decisions.
2 Model set-up
There are N > 1 independent suppliers. Each supplier i = 1, ..., N has a unique product. The marginal
cost of supplying each product (i.e. the opportunity cost to suppliers of providing the product for
sale) is normalized to zero without loss of generality. To sell the products to buyers, suppliers must
go through a monopoly intermediary.
Initially, in our model all products (and all suppliers) are treated symmetrically. This allows us
to show the trade-offs we are interested in most clearly when focusing on the choice between a pure
reseller (R) and a pure marketplace (M). The role of asymmetries across products is discussed in
Section 4, where such asymmetries provide a natural explanation of why intermediaries may prefer a
hybrid mode.
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2.1 Demand structure
There is a continuum of many identical buyers. Each buyer is willing to pay v for each product she is
interested in, where v is commonly known. In order to access the products, buyers must affiliate with
(i.e. join) the intermediary, which we assume is costless.
We assume that the number of buyers for product i is
m− (ai − a∗i )2 ,
where ai is the choice of marketing activities made by the owner of product i (supplier i or the reseller),
and where
a∗i = θ + γi + δi
is the ideal choice of marketing activity for product i. We have in mind activities that take place at
or over the intermediary and that help attract (and convert) buyers.
We assume θ is commonly known. The term γi is an i.i.d. random variable, whose realization is
private information known to the intermediary at the time it chooses its marketing activities. Similarly,
the term δi is an i.i.d. random variable, whose realization is private information known to supplier i
at the time the supplier chooses its marketing activities. The random variables γi and δi are drawn
independently for all i, and they have expected values equal to zero and variances denoted Vγ and Vδ,
respectively.
The key assumption is that marketing activities ai are non-contractible: this may be because they
encompass unobservable actions or are too costly to fully specify in a contract. Still, an intermediary
or supplier that was fully informed of γi and δi would be able to choose the ideal marketing activity for
product i and thereby achieve the highest level of demand possible (i.e. m). We therefore also assume
that the private information contained in γi and δi is prohibitively hard to communicate to the other
party in a cost-effective manner. Absent full information, neither suppliers nor the intermediary can
expect to make the ideal choice of marketing activities. The extent to which the owner of product i
(supplier i or the reseller) is expected to be less effective depends on the variance of the component of
a∗i that it does not observe. Thus, the relative importance of the intermediary’s versus the suppliers’
local information is captured by the comparison between Vγ and Vδ.
Our formulation of marketing activities above is best interpreted as representing a “horizontal
choice”. A given product can be marketed in multiple ways, all at the same cost, which we normalize
to zero. For example, suppose there is a fixed amount of promotion that can be done for each TV
product at Best Buy: the amount may be restricted by the available signage space or by the limited
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amount of time that sales staff have to discuss products with potential buyers. That fixed promotion
capacity can be allocated among two activities: emphasizing the specific brand of the TV set vs.
emphasizing specific product features (e.g. high-definition or smart TV functionality). One can then
interpret ai as the relative amounts of promotion capacity allocated to brand emphasis and promotion
capacity allocated to emphasis of product features. If ai is below the ideal level a
∗
i then further
emphasizing brand at the expense of product features will attract more buyers to product i, and
conversely if ai is above the ideal level a
∗
i .
4
More generally, one can think of ai as encompassing dimensions of how shelf space or stores
(physical or virtual) are laid out. Suppliers and the reseller may have different information about the
best way to make such lay-out decisions. Different lay-out arrangements have similar costs, so these
can be considered horizontal decisions. For instance, one dimension along which suppliers and the
reseller might have different information on is the extent to which demand is maximized by putting
the same brand’s products close together versus putting complementary products (of different brands)
close together.
Needless to say, there are other ways to formulate how marketing activities affect demand. For
our purposes there are two critical modeling ingredients: (i) the marketing choice is influenced by the
private information embodied in a∗i and (ii) the optimal choice a
∗
i is well defined due to diminishing
returns to marketing. In Section 5.1 we provide an alternative modelling formulation in which ai can
be interpreted as the level of investment in marketing, so a higher ai always increases demand, with
the marginal effectiveness proportional to a∗i . By assuming quadratic marketing costs, we show that
the baseline tradeoffs in Section 3 below remain the same.
2.2 Cost structure
If the intermediary is a marketplace, each individual supplier incurs a fixed cost, denoted FM > 0,
which is the cost of setting up the capability of selling on the marketplace. Each supplier also incurs
a constant transaction cost of selling each unit of its product, equal to fM . If the intermediary is
a reseller, it incurs a fixed cost FR > 0 for each product it offers (e.g. the costs of quality control,
inventory capacity, contractual arrangements, etc). R’s transaction cost of selling each unit of a
product is equal to fR. We add the natural assumption that v > fk for k ∈ {M,R}. We also assume
that the profit from each product is positive regardless of whether it is offered under the R-mode or
the M -mode. Equations (4) and (8) in Section 3 below show that a sufficient condition to ensure this
property is:
(v − fk) [m−max (Vδ, Vγ)] > Fk, (1)
4We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this interpretation of our model.
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for k ∈ {M,R}.
Initially, we assume that f ≡ fM = fR and F ≡ FM = FR, so that the cost structure of supplying
n products is the same under the two different modes of intermediation. This assumption will be
relaxed in Section 3.2 where we focus on cost differences that can affect the choice between the two
modes. We normalize the fixed costs of setting up an intermediary (i.e. before it sells any products)
to zero, regardless of its mode.
2.3 Pricing instruments and control rights
If the intermediary chooses the R-mode, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to n ≤ N suppliers.
The offer consists of the price R will pay for each unit it buys, in exchange for which R obtains the
control rights over marketing and pricing to buyers. R then chooses marketing activities and prices
offered to buyers for all products whose suppliers have accepted the contract offer. As will be noted
below, the pricing choice is trivial in our model, so only control over marketing choices matters.
Whenever it makes a sale to buyers, R pays the contract price to the corresponding supplier.
If the intermediary chooses the M -mode, its take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to n ≤ N suppliers
consists simply of a fixed participation fee P that each supplier must pay in order to join. In our
benchmark setting, restricting M to a participation fee is without loss of generality: it would not do
any better if it were able to observe supplier sales and charge variable fees. Where there is a role
for variable fees, this will be explicitly noted and analyzed. Participating suppliers maintain control
over marketing activities and pricing to buyers, to whom they sell directly. In particular, there is no
access fee to buyers. As will become clear below, this assumption is immaterial since in our benchmark
model, buyers are left with zero surplus.
Consistent with our distinction between marketplaces and resellers, we assume only one party (R
or the corresponding supplier i) has control rights over marketing activities for a given product i that
affect consumer demand through this particular intermediary. This does not rule out that suppliers
may also choose marketing activities through other channels than the intermediary, but these are
assumed to work independently of the activities we are studying, so we abstract from them.
The reason we have chosen marketing activities as the focal decision variable is two-fold. First,
in many real-world contexts, prices are set by contracts between suppliers and intermediaries (e.g.
through resale price-maintenance agreements). In such contexts, pricing decisions do not create any
meaningful economic distinctions between marketplaces and resellers. In contrast, marketing activities
are much less likely to be contractible. For instance, it would be very hard for Sony to enforce specific
ways in which Best Buy sales people are supposed to talk about Sony products to customers. The only
realistic way Sony could do this would be to have its own sales people in Best Buy stores — a situation
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which is captured by the marketplace mode in our model. Second, from a modelling perspective, it
turns out that working with marketing activities is quite tractable and allows us to explore a broad
range of tradeoffs. For completeness, in Section 5.5 we consider a version of our model with prices as
the non-contractible decision variables and show that our main findings continue to hold.
2.4 Timing
The timing we assume throughout is as follows:
Stage 0. Intermediary chooses mode — Reseller or Marketplace
Reseller Marketplace
Stage 1. Reseller makes take-it-or-leave-it offer to
suppliers; suppliers decide whether or not to accept.
Stage 1. Marketplace sets the fixed participation fee
P to suppliers; suppliers decide whether or not to
participate.
Stage 2. Reseller learns γi for each product and
chooses marketing activities and prices to buyers for
all products it has acquired.
Stage 2. Each supplier learns its δi and chooses the
corresponding marketing activity and price to buy-
ers.
Stage 3. Buyers make purchase decisions. Stage 3. Buyers make purchase decisions.
These particular timing assumptions are not critical to our analysis. The important assumption
is that parties should learn their private information prior to making their decisions about marketing
activities. We denote by ER [.] the expectation taken by R and by Ei [.] the expectation taken by
supplier i after they learn their private information. We denote by E [.] the expectations taken by
either party prior to learning their private information.
Some straightforward implications follow from our timing assumption. First, in all cases, the owner
of each product i (supplier i or R) charges buyers a price equal to v, which extracts the entire buyer
surplus. Indeed, an informed buyer that wishes to purchase product i does so whenever her opportunity
cost of going to the intermediary (zero by assumption) plus the price charged for the product is less
than or equal to her willingness-to-pay v. This allows us to focus on the key tradeoffs between the two
modes without introducing any pricing distortions on the buyer side. Since pricing does not depend on
local information in any way, it does not produce any meaningful difference between the two modes of
intermediation in our model. Thus, whether prices can be contracted or not is irrelevant in our setting.
Instead, all the action is concentrated in the choices of marketing activities. Second, the intermediary
has all the bargaining power. It therefore extracts the entire expected surplus from all participating
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suppliers.5 As a result, in the benchmark model, total intermediary profit and total expected surplus
(or welfare) are the same. This changes in Section 3.3, where M suffers from unfavorable supplier
expectations.
3 Key tradeoffs
This section presents the analysis and results for the benchmark setting outlined in the previous
section, in the case of an intermediary choosing between the R-mode and the M -mode. We then
introduce the possibility of spillovers, cost differences and network effects to highlight other important
tradeoffs between the two modes.
Reseller R’s optimal contract offer to suppliers is to buy each unit at a price of zero — suppliers
accept since it meets their opportunity cost, which we have normalized to zero. Suppose R makes
the offer to n ≤ N suppliers, so that it can sell n products to buyers. R then decides on a1, ..., an to
maximize its expected profit from selling the different products.
The reseller sets a1, ..., an together to maximize expected joint profit after observing γ1, ..., γn, but
without observing δ1, ..., δn. The reseller’s expected profit at stage 2 can be written as
ΠR (n) = (v − f)
n∑
i=1
ER
[
m− (ai − (θ + γi + δi))2
]
− nF. (2)
Using that ER (δi) = 0 and taking first order conditions, we obtain the optimal choice of marketing
activities for each product
aRi = θ + γi. (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) and taking expectations, the reseller’s expected profit of selling each product
is
(v − f) (m− Vδ)− F. (4)
Given (1), this is positive, so the reseller offers all N products to obtain the expected profit
ΠR = N ((v − f) (m− Vδ)− F ) . (5)
5Our main results do not depend on these simplifying features of the model. In particular, we show that they continue
to hold both when suppliers have positive bargaining power (see Section 5.2) and when buyers have bargaining power
(see Section 5.4).
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Marketplace In this mode, suppliers maintain control rights over their marketing decisions ai.
Supplier i’s expected profit net of the participation fee P , evaluated at stage 2, is
pii = (v − f)Ei
[
m− (ai − (θ + γi + δi))2
]
− F − P, (6)
where supplier i observes its own δi after joining the platform (but not any γi or any other δj). Using
that Ei (γi) = 0 and taking first order conditions, we obtain the optimal choice of marketing activities
for each product
aMi = θ + δi. (7)
Substituting (7) into (6) and taking expectations, supplier i’s expected profit from participating with
M is
pii = (v − f) (m− Vγ)− F − P. (8)
M can set P = (v − f) (m− Vγ) − F per supplier, which is positive given (1). It will therefore want
to attract all N suppliers to obtain an expected profit of
ΠM = N ((v − f) (m− Vγ)− F ) . (9)
Comparing (5) with (9), we obtain the following benchmark result
Proposition 1 The M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if the variance of the suppliers’
local information exceeds the variance of the intermediary’s local information, i.e. if and only if
Vδ ≥ Vγ.
The condition above provides a simple benchmark to evaluate reseller-versus-marketplace tradeoffs.
Control should be given to the party whose information is more important in terms of how best to
design marketing activities. Note this comparison does not depend on the assumption that m, θ, or F
are the same for each product. The result would be identical if these varied across products in some
way which was equally observed by suppliers and the intermediary. Our result also does not depend
on M being assumed to charge only a fixed participation fee. If M could observe sales and also set
a variable fee per unit of sales, this would reduce the supplier’s margin from each sale, but not the
choice of marketing activities. As a result, the effect would be to just transfer profits from the supplier
to M , as with the participation fee.
In Proposition 1 we implicitly assumed that the intermediary has to choose the same mode for
all of its products. This assumption is without loss of generality in this benchmark setting, given the
informational advantage (whichever direction it is in) is consistent across products. An intermediary
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that offers some products directly itself (i.e. in the R-mode) and allows independent suppliers to sell
other products over its platform (i.e. in the M -mode) would do strictly worse whenever Vδ 6= Vγ . We
explore settings in which such a hybrid mode would be chosen in Section 4.
3.1 Cross-product spillovers
In many real-world settings, marketing activities have cross-product spillovers. This naturally occurs
when the different products belong to the same product category. To reflect this in the simplest
possible way, suppose higher levels of the marketing choice for one product either increase or decrease
the number of buyers for all other products. Assuming spillovers take a linear form, demand for
product i becomes
m− (ai − a∗i )2 + x
∑
j 6=i
aj ,
where x is the magnitude of the spillovers.
We allow x to be either negative or positive in order to accommodate different interpretations.
For instance, recall our interpretation of marketing activities ai as horizontal choices and consider
our previous example of Best Buy and TV sets (see Section 2.1). In this example, allocating a larger
amount of signage space to the brand of a particular TV relative to its product features may decrease
demand for other products by crowding out consumer attention for other brands, or by reducing
the positive spillover that would be created by promoting the common product features (e.g. smart
TV functionality). Similarly, in the example of store lay-out, locating products of the same brands
close together rather than the complementary products of different brands would reduce the positive
spillovers across complementary products of different brands.
R’s profit at stage 2 if it sells n products is
ΠR (n) = max
a1,a2,..,an
(v − f)
n∑
i=1
ER
m− (ai − a∗i )2 + x∑
j 6=i
aj
− nF
 .
Compared to before, R adjusts its marketing activities for product i to take into account the externality
on the (n− 1) other products, so
aRi = θ + γi +
x
2
(n− 1) .
Substituting aRi back into profits, the reseller’s expected profit from selling n products is
ΠR (n) = (v − f)
n∑
i=1
m− Vδ + xθ (n− 1) + x∑
j 6=i
γj +
x2 (n− 1)2
4
− nF.
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Therefore, at stage 1, the expected profit of a reseller selling n products is
E [ΠR (n)] = n
(
(v − f)
(
m− Vδ + xθ (n− 1) + x
2 (n− 1)2
4
)
− F
)
.
If x < 0 then assumption (1) is no longer sufficient to ensure intermediaries prefer to operate with all
N products. We assume instead
(v − f) (m−max (Vδ, Vγ) + xθ (N − 1)) > F, (10)
which requires that x cannot be too negative. Under this assumption, R will want to offer all N
products and obtains expected profit
ΠR = N
(
(v − f)
(
m− Vδ + xθ (N − 1) + x
2 (N − 1)2
4
)
− F
)
. (11)
In contrast, an individual supplier selling over M obtains expected profit of
pii = (v − f)Ei
m− (ai − a∗i )2 + x∑
j 6=i
aj
− F,
so it ignores the effect of its choice of marketing activities on other suppliers. The result of profit
maximization is aMi = θ + δi, as before, and so the expected profit for a given supplier deciding
whether or not to participate at stage 1 is
pii = (v − f) (m− Vγ + xθ (n− 1))− F.
Note that an individual supplier’s profit depends on how many other suppliers join, through the
term xθ (n− 1). When x > 0 this feature can give rise to multiple equilibria for given participation
fees, where more suppliers join if they expect others to join. To address this potential multiplicity
of equilibria, we assume here that suppliers hold favorable expectations, meaning suppliers always
coordinate on an equilibrium in which all of them join if doing so gives them non-negative profits in
the resulting equilibrium.6 Again, (10) ensures M can extract a positive fee from each supplier, and
so M will offer all N products even if x < 0, and obtain an expected profit of
ΠM = N ((v − f) (m− Vγ + xθ (N − 1))− F ) . (12)
6The case in which suppliers hold unfavorable expectations is analyzed in Section 3.3. See footnote 7 there.
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Comparing (11) and (12) we obtain:
Proposition 2 The M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if Vδ ≥ Vγ + x
2(N−1)2
4 .
Introducing spillovers unambiguously shifts the tradeoff in favor of the R-mode. Thus, the R-mode
may now be preferred even if Vδ > Vγ . This reflects that R takes into account the cross-product
externalities from the promotion of product i on other products, something M cannot do if suppliers
cannot coordinate their decisions and M cannot condition on suppliers’ choices of marketing activity.
As a result, the M -mode is preferred whenever suppliers’ informational advantage in exploiting local
information more than offsets the importance of accounting for externalities. Note that the sign of the
externality x (i.e. whether spillovers are positive or negative) does not matter in this case — all that
matters is its magnitude. Also note that variable fees remain redundant since they do not influence
an individual supplier’s choice of marketing activities.
3.2 Cost differences
In this section we focus on the effect of cost differences between R and M . Recall in the benchmark
setting we assumed FR = FM and fR = fM . Consider relaxing these equalities. Equations (5) and (9)
become
ΠR = N ((v − fR) (m− Vδ)− FR)
ΠM = N ((v − fM ) (m− Vγ)− FM ) .
Given (1) both expressions are positive. We obtain:
Proposition 3 The M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if:
Vδ ≥ Vγ + (m− Vγ) (fM − fR) + FM − FR
v − fR . (13)
If fM > fR (respectively, fM < fR) then the M -mode is relatively more profitable when m is low
(respectively, when m is high).
If both cost differences go in the same direction (i.e. fM − fR and FM − FR have the same sign),
then the baseline tradeoff is unambiguously tilted in the direction of the lower-cost mode. On the other
hand, if the fixed and variable cost differences go in opposite directions (i.e. fM − fR and FM − FR
have opposite signs), then the effect of cost differences on the benchmark tradeoff is ambiguous. It
depends on the magnitude of fixed cost savings relative to the magnitude of variable cost savings, and
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whether m is high (i.e. “short-tail” or popular products) or if m is low (i.e. “long-tail” or unpopular
products). We explore the implications of this result for explaining why some products are offered in
M -mode and some in R-mode in Section 4.3.
3.3 Network effects with unfavorable expectations
Previously, we have assumed that the number of buyers for each supplier does not depend on how
many suppliers the buyer can purchase from. If buyers are more likely to come to an intermediary
with more suppliers present (or offering more products), then suppliers’ expectations can matter. To
capture a possible cross-group network effect between suppliers and buyers, suppose m increases in n.
This could arise because the more products are made available, the more buyers will become aware of
the intermediary (e.g. through word of mouth, reputation effects or other sources of information and
review) or the more likely a given buyer that is informed about a particular product available through
the intermediary will be to find other products of interest through the intermediary. In other words,
we allow for positive agglomeration effects, contained in m (n). We normalize m ≡ m (N). To ensure
M is always profitable we add to (1) the new assumption that
(v − f) (m (1)− Vγ) > F. (14)
The previous analysis remains valid in the presence of this network effect, provided M benefits
from favorable expectations — i.e. suppliers always coordinate on joining if they make non-negative
profits in the resulting equilibrium. Since m is increasing in n, the marketplace wants to sign up all N
suppliers. It charges them a participation fee equal to their expected profit (8), which assumes each
expects all other suppliers to join when facing this fee. R’s problem is also unaffected. Suppliers do
not need to form expectations of how many other suppliers join when deciding whether or not to sell
to R, since whether it is profitable to do so is independent of how many buyers show up.
Let us now examine the case in which suppliers hold unfavorable expectations, i.e. they coordinate
on not joining the marketplace whenever this is an equilibrium. This scenario is particularly relevant
for marketplaces that are part of early-stage ventures. Our treatment of unfavorable expectations
follows Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Hagiu and Spulber (2013), and Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013).
The optimal choices of marketing by suppliers are unchanged compared to Section 3 because
individual suppliers do not take into account the number of other suppliers that join when choosing
their marketing activities. Thus, each individual supplier’s expected net profit from joining M when it
expects ne ≥ 0 other suppliers to join is (v − f) (m (ne + 1)− Vγ)−F−P , where P is the participation
fee charged by M . We denote this profit pi (ne + 1)− P . Note that ne depends on P : we have chosen
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not to write ne (P ) in order to avoid clutter. When suppliers hold unfavorable expectations, for any
given P , each supplier expects no other supplier to join whenever this is an equilibrium, i.e. whenever
pi (1)− P ≤ 0. In this case, if M charges P > pi (1) then there is an equilibrium in which no suppliers
join: each supplier expects no other suppliers to join, which implies she would make negative profits
if she were to join on her own. Since this equilibrium prevails under unfavorable expectations, M
does not wish to set P > pi (1). Thus, the maximum price that M can charge so that suppliers join is
P = pi (1). At this price, the only equilibrium is that all N suppliers offered the contract join, because
they are willing to join irrespective of what they expect other suppliers to do. Given this, they must
rationally expect all other suppliers to join when this participation fee is charged. The profit extracted
by M is therefore Npi (1), which is equal to
ΠM = N ((v − f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F ) . (15)
Note that (15) is less than (9) given m is increasing inn, so that unfavorable expectations lower M ’s
profit. Assumption (14) ensures that M still prefers to attract all N suppliers. Comparing (15) with
(5), we have:
Proposition 4 When m is increasing in n and the intermediary faces unfavorable expectations, the
M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if
Vδ ≥ Vγ +m (N)−m (1) . (16)
Unfavorable expectations shift the tradeoff unambiguously in favor of the R -mode, which may now
be preferred even when the local information of individual suppliers is more important. The additional
term on the right hand side of the inequality captures the size of the network effect. The R-mode
allows the intermediary to sidestep the unfavorable expectations problem that the M -mode can run
into.7
There are two ways for M to mitigate the problem arising from network effects and unfavorable
expectations. One is to offer some products under the R-mode, an option we analyze in Section 4.
The other option is to charge a variable fee per unit of sales (if it can observe supplier sales). This can
eliminate the need to set a fixed participation fee, and so reduces the role of network effects. In fact, if
M can pay suppliers to join, then it can completely overcome unfavorable expectations by subsidizing
7Using the same approach, we can derive the equilibrium under unfavorable expectations for the setting in Section 3.1,
in which m is constant and x > 0. If suppliers hold unfavorable expectations, the marketplace can charge at most
P = pi (1) = (v − f) (m− Vγ) − F . Comparing this to the profits of a reseller, which are unchanged, the M -mode is
preferred if and only if Vδ ≥ Vγ + xθ (N − 1) + x
2(N−1)2
4
. Since x > 0, unfavorable expectations once again tilt the
decision in favor of the R-mode, but the tradeoff remains otherwise the same.
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the suppliers’ fixed participation costs and extracting all of their rents through variable fees. This
leads to (almost) the same profits as under favorable expectations. Such subsidies may, however, not
be feasible, for instance because they could lead to an adverse selection problem in which firms that
are not genuine suppliers join simply to collect the subsidy. In the Appendix we prove:
Proposition 5 When m is increasing in n, the intermediary faces unfavorable expectations, the mar-
ketplace can observe and condition on suppliers’ sales but cannot subsidize suppliers to join the mar-
ketplace, the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if
Vδ ≥ Vγ + ρ (m (N)−m (1)) , (17)
where
ρ =
F
(v − f) (m (1)− Vγ) ∈ (0, 1) .
Comparing (17) with (16), the effect of network effects is dampened by the multiplying factor ρ
which lies strictly between 0 and 1. Thus, while the intermediary’s choice is still unambiguously tilted
towards the R-mode in the face of network effects and unfavorable expectations, variable fees do help
to mitigate the effect.
4 Hybrid modes
So far we have focused on an intermediary that has to choose between the M -mode and the R-mode.
In Section 3 we noted that an intermediary that could offer some products under each mode would
not want to do so. In reality, intermediaries that sell products using both modes are quite prevalent.
Amazon is a prominent example. As discussed in the introduction, Best Buy and department stores
are other examples. In the sections that follow, we highlight several key factors which can make a
hybrid mode optimal.
4.1 Heterogenous information
In our benchmark model, we have assumed the variances of supplier and intermediary information,
respectively, are the same for all products. Suppose instead they are different, such that for all
i ∈ SR ⊂ [N ] ≡ {1, .., N} we have V ar (γi) > V ar (δi), and for all i ∈ SM = [N ] \SR we have
V ar (γi) < V ar (δi). It is then straightforward to see:
Proposition 6 The intermediary’s optimal strategy is to offer all products i ∈ SR in the R-mode and
all products i ∈ SM in the M -mode.
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In other words, the intermediary should use the R-mode for all products where it has an information
advantage over suppliers and the M -mode for all products where the advantage lies with suppliers.
4.2 Heterogenous spillovers
As we have seen, spillovers across products unambiguously shift the basic tradeoff in favor of the R-
mode. If all spillovers are the same as we assumed in Section 3.1, then the optimal model is still either
a pure reseller or a pure marketplace. In reality, spillovers may be asymmetric, i.e. some products
generate larger spillovers than others. In such scenarios, if suppliers’ information is more important
than reseller information, it may be optimal to have some products offered in the M -mode (those
products for which marketing does not generate any systematic and significant spillovers) and others
offered in the R-mode (those products for which marketing generates a consistent and important
spillover in one direction).
To illustrate, suppose there exists a partition of [N ] into two sets SR and SM = [N ] \SR, such that
all products i ∈ SR generate spillovers equal to x among each other but no spillovers on products
i ∈ SM , and products i ∈ SM generate no spillovers whatsoever. Then the profits of the intermediary
can be decomposed into the two sets of products, with the profits being separable across the two
groups. Thus, Proposition 2 applies to the group of products in SR and Proposition 1 applies to the
group of products in SM . We obtain:
Proposition 7 Suppose all products i ∈ SR generate spillovers equal to x on each other, while products
i ∈ SM do not generate nor receive any spillovers. The intermediary chooses the interior hybrid mode
in which it offers products i ∈ SR under the R-mode and products i ∈ SM under the M -mode if and
only if
Vγ < Vδ ≤ Vγ + (NR − 1)
2 x2
4
.
Otherwise, if Vδ ≤ Vγ then the intermediary chooses the pure R-mode; if Vδ > Vγ + (NR−1)
2x2
4 then the
intermediary chooses the pure M -mode.
Clearly the pure R-mode dominates if Vδ ≤ Vγ . Not only does R have an information advantage
for all products, but it can fully internalize the effect of the spillovers between products in SR. If
Vδ > Vγ , then the information advantage rests with the suppliers, so the M -mode is preferred for
those products in SM for which there are no spillovers. If Vδ is sufficiently high, this information
advantage will more than offset the benefit of coordinating marketing activities, and the intermediary
will prefer the M -mode even for the products in SR.
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A more interesting case arises if the spillovers generated from products inSR extend to all products.
In this case, even if the intermediary controls all products in SR under the R-mode it will still not
internalize all the spillovers they create. There can then be a role for offering some additional products
(i.e. some from SM ) in the R-mode. In the appendix, we prove:
Proposition 8 Suppose all products i ∈ SR generate spillovers equal to x on all other products, while
products i ∈ SM do not generate any spillovers. Assume N2R +NR > 2N − 1. Then the optimal mode
is:
• pure R-mode if Vδ − Vγ ≤ x24 NR
• sell NR products in SR and k∗ products from SM under the R-mode and all other products under
the M -mode if x
2
4 NR ≤ Vδ − Vγ ≤ x
2
4
(
1−N2R + 2N (NR − 1)
)
, where k∗ ∈ [1, N −NR − 1]
satisfies the following bounds
(N −NR)− 2 (Vδ − Vγ)
NRx2
− 1
2
< k∗ < (N −NR)− 2 (Vδ − Vγ)
NRx2
+
1
2
(18)
• pure M -mode if Vδ − Vγ ≥ x24
(
1−N2R + 2N (NR − 1)
)
.
Once again, the pure R-mode dominates if Vδ ≤ Vγ . In case Vδ > Vγ , the intermediary now faces a
tradeoff. Suppliers within SMenjoy an information advantage, but, by taking control of some products
from SM , the intermediary can better internalize the spillovers generated by the marketing choices
of products in SR. This also raises the amount that independent suppliers are willing to pay to join,
given that the marketing activities of products in SR are better optimized in terms of the spillovers
they create.
4.3 Heterogeneous products and cost differences
Suppose the value of m differs across products so that m1 ≤ m2 ≤ ... ≤ mN with at least one inequality
strict. Some products are long-tail products (have low mi) and some products are short-tail products
(have high mi). Furthermore, assume there are cost differences as in Section 3.2. Then the profit the
intermediary obtains from product i if it operates in the R-mode is (v − fR) (mi − Vδ)−FR. Allowing
M to set different participation fees for the different products to reflect the different values of m, the
profit the intermediary obtains from product i if it operates in the M -mode is (v − fM ) (mi − Vγ)−FM .
Then it follows:
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Proposition 9 If fM > fR (respectively, fM < fR) then the intermediary’s optimal strategy is to
offer products i such that mi ≤ m∗ in the M -mode (respectively, R-mode) and products i such that
mi > m
∗ in the R-mode (respectively, M -mode), where the cutoff m∗ is given by
m∗ =
Vδ (v − fR)− Vγ (v − fM ) + FR − FM
fM − fR .
In other words, when the marketplace has a variable cost disadvantage (i.e. when fM > fR), an
intermediary facing heterogeneous product demands should sell long-tail products in the M -mode and
short-tail products in the R-mode. And vice versa when the marketplace has a variable cost advantage.
We discuss empirical implications of and evidence for this result in Section 6.
4.4 Unfavorable expectations
Suppose, as in Section 3.3, that m is increasing in n, i.e. there are network effects. In this case,
the presence of unfavorable expectations creates a natural reason for the intermediary to choose
a hybrid strategy: offer a sufficient number of products under the R-mode in order to overcome
unfavorable expectations, but not too many if suppliers’ local information is more important than the
intermediary’s.
Suppose the intermediary offers 0 ≤ nR ≤ N products under the R-mode and (N − nR) products
under the M -mode. Unfavorable expectations means that independent suppliers expect the intermedi-
ary will only be able to offer the nR products it has bought as a reseller whenever it is an equilibrium
for the independent suppliers not to affiliate (i.e. when their surplus is negative if they each assume
all the other independent suppliers do not affiliate). Thus, the amount the intermediary can extract
from independent suppliers (if nR < N) is
(N − nR) ((v − f) (m (nR + 1)− Vγ)− F ) .
Its profit from selling the remaining nR products itself is
nR ((v − f) (m (N)− Vδ)− F ) .
Adding the two components of profit, the intermediary’s expected profit is
Π (nR) = (v − f)
 (N − nR)m (nR + 1) + nRm (N)
− (N − nR)Vγ − nRVδ
− nF. (19)
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Since m (N) > m (nR + 1) and since m (nR + 1) is increasing in nR for nR < N − 1, the first term
in square brackets is unambiguously increasing in nR up to nR = N − 1. This represents the fact
that the R-mode allows the intermediary to avoid unfavorable expectations, so shifting more products
to this mode increases profit. By itself, this term would push the intermediary to offer all products
in the R-mode.8 However, if Vδ > Vγ , then the second term in square brackets is decreasing in nR.
This is due to the informational advantage of suppliers in the M -mode. Thus, there can be a tradeoff.
Offering more products in the R-mode helps overcome unfavorable expectations but it loses valuable
supplier information. The following proposition is proven in the appendix.
Proposition 10 Suppose m (nK) = m − α (N − nK) for 1 ≤ nK ≤ N , with α > 0. If Vδ ≤ Vγ,
then the intermediary will choose to offer all products in the R-mode. If Vγ < Vδ < Vγ + 2α (N − 1),
the intermediary will adopt a hybrid mode. If Vδ ≥ Vγ + 2α (N − 1), the intermediary will offer all
products in the M -mode. In the case that the intermediary adopts the hybrid solution, the optimal
number of products n∗R offered in the R-mode is bounded by the inequalities
N − 1− Vδ − Vγ
2α
< n∗R < N −
Vδ − Vγ
2α
. (20)
If Vδ ≤ Vγ , then the R-mode dominates both on informational grounds and as a way to overcome
unfavorable expectations. When Vδ > Vγ , offering N − 1 products in the R-mode fully overcomes
pessimistic expectations, leaving one product to be offered in the M -mode to exploit the information
advantage suppliers have in this case. Of course, once Vδ is sufficiently large relative to Vγ , it is optimal
to offer all products in the M -mode. Note the bounds in (20) for the optimum number of products
sold in the R-mode are decreasing in Vδ − Vγ (consistent with an informational advantage driving the
choice between the two modes) and increasing in the magnitude of network effects α (consistent with
the finding of 3.3 that network effects are detrimental to the M -mode under unfavorable expectations).
5 Robustness
In this section we discuss the implications of some modifications to our setup, which are meant to
highlight the robustness and general nature of the insights we have drawn.
8Note selling N−1 products in the R-mode and one in the M -mode would be equivalent to selling all N in the R-mode
from the perspective of overcoming unfavorable expectations.
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5.1 Costly marketing activities
Consider an alternative formulation of marketing activities. Rather than representing them as hor-
izontal choices, we now assume marketing activities ai represent the actual levels of investment in
marketing through or on the intermediary, and that the marginal effectiveness of marketing activities
is proportional to a∗i . Specifically, demand for product i is
m+ 2 (θ + γi + δi) ai,
where θ, γi and δi satisfy the same assumptions as before.
9 Investing ai in marketing activities implies
a cost κa2i , which is incurred by the supplier (M -mode) or by the intermediary (R-mode). Thus,
additional spending on marketing activities increases demand, although with diminishing returns. We
have in mind costly activities that bring in additional buyers by making them more aware of the product
being marketed. The assumption of private information captures that suppliers and intermediaries
may each have some information about how effective spending on marketing activities will be for a
given product.
In the Supplementary Appendix we show that our main results from Section 3 carry through. In
particular, Propositions 1 and 2 are unchanged. The formulas in Propositions 3, 4 and 5 are somewhat
modified but the key tradeoffs remain the same.
5.2 Supplier bargaining power
Up to now we have assumed the intermediary held all the bargaining power: it made take-it-or-leave-
it offers to suppliers in stage 1 and extracted their entire expected surplus under both modes. It is
straightforward to extend our model to scenarios in which suppliers have positive bargaining power.
Suppose, consistent with our timing of offers, bargaining occurs in stage 1. To do so, suppose suppliers
have bargaining power β ∈ [0, 1], meaning that each supplier will only be agreeable to deal with the
intermediary if the supplier retains a fraction β of the expected joint profit she generates, with the
remaining fraction (1− β) retained by the intermediary. This could either be done by reducing the
participation fee charged by the marketplace or by making a fixed payment to the supplier in the case
of a reseller (or equivalently, by increasing the wholesale price paid to the supplier).
In the Supplementary Appendix we show that, once again, our main results from Section 3 carry
through. In particular, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are unchanged. The analysis corresponding to Propo-
sitions 4 and 5 is somewhat modified but the key results remain the same. The only difference is that
when supplier bargaining power is above a certain threshold, the effect of unfavorable expectations
9The constant 2 normalizes the marginal effectiveness of ai to be the same as in our benchmark specification.
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disappears completely and the benchmark tradeoff from Proposition 1 is restored. The explanation
is as follows: if supplier bargaining power is sufficiently strong then the participation fees charged
to suppliers are low anyway, so that all suppliers want to participate regardless of their expectations
about what other suppliers will do. In this case, the nature of expectations is no longer relevant to
the tradeoff between the two modes.
5.3 Downward-sloping demand from suppliers
We have assumed that in the absence of network effects, both M and R can extract the entire expected
surplus from suppliers. This was either because suppliers (and their products) were completely sym-
metric or, where they were not, because we implicitly assumed that intermediaries (M in particular)
could price discriminate, i.e. M could observe any heterogeneity across suppliers and set different
participation fees accordingly.
It is straightforward to extend our model to accommodate heterogeneity across products, such that
the heterogeneous parameter (e.g. different mi’s across products) is unobservable to the intermediary.
In this case, the intermediary would be unable to extract the full supplier surplus and would therefore
face a supplier demand for participation that is downward-sloping in the price(s) charged (under both
modes). As long as the heterogeneous parameter does not affect marketing activities (for instance,
heterogeneity in m has no bearing on the choices of marketing activities), our main results and con-
clusions go through unchanged. In the Supplementary Appendix we provide a brief illustration of this
point with heterogeneous m.
5.4 Buyer surplus and affiliation
We have assumed that buyer affiliation with the intermediary was costless and that the intermediary
and/or the suppliers were able to extract the entire buyer surplus in all scenarios. These features of
our model allowed us to avoid introducing any pricing distortions in the analysis. Our model can,
however, be extended such that: (i) buyers incur heterogeneous opportunity costs when joining the
intermediary (either M or R); and (ii) buyers have positive bargaining power, which allows them to
retain some surplus from their transactions with R or the individual suppliers. In particular, we can
allow R to have greater (or equal) bargaining power over buyers relative to individual suppliers. This
fits real-world scenarios in which R aggregates the bargaining powers of many individual suppliers,
such as for example Intellectual Ventures in the market for patents (see Hagiu and Wright 2013 and
Hagiu and Yoffie 2013).
It is straightforward to show that in this context our main tradeoffs remain unchanged. The
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benchmark tradeoff is simply augmented by terms which reflect the new differences between M and
R, namely that the R-mode allows the intermediary to extract more rents from buyers, but, for this
exact reason, the M -mode attracts a larger number of buyers, as they expect to obtain a larger net
surplus. The formalization of these results is contained in the Supplementary Appendix.
5.5 Other non-contractible decision variables
Throughout the paper, we have chosen to focus on marketing activities as the key non-contractible
decision driving the difference between the two modes. As discussed in the introduction, however,
there are other potentially non-contractible decisions that one could focus on. For example, if there
are privately observed demand shocks, similar tradeoffs to those we have derived will arise when the
non-contractible decisions are product prices rather than marketing activities. Consider the simplest
possible setting. Suppose each supplier offers a single product, is subject to linear demand, and
all variable costs are set to zero. The level of demand for each product is subject to two demand
shocks, one which is only observed by the corresponding supplier and one which is only observed
by R. For this case, one can show that essentially the same tradeoffs arise as in our benchmark
model. The extent to which the M -mode is preferred over the R-mode boils down to whether the
local information on demand by suppliers is more important (has higher variance) than the local
information of the intermediary. In the case that products are independent, the tradeoff is in fact
identical to our benchmark result in Proposition 1. Relative to this, the choice is shifted towards the
R-mode to the extent there is a spillover in demand, which will be the case if products are substitutes
or complements. This shows the result of Proposition 2 continues to apply.
6 Empirical implications
In this section we discuss some empirical illustrations of and evidence for our main results.
Consider our baseline result from Proposition 1 and its extension to the case with heterogenous in-
formation in Proposition 6: the marketplace-mode is preferred to the reseller-mode whenever the local
information held by suppliers is more important than the local information held by the reseller. Three
real-world examples illustrate this result: Amazon with respect to books and electronics, department
stores and BestBuy.
Amazon started off in 1994 as a reseller of books; it added the electronics category in 1999.
Furthermore, the products under the electronics category change notoriously fast. As a result, Amazon
likely has more of an information disadvantage relative to its suppliers with respect to electronics
than with respect to books. We therefore expect that Amazon should sell a lower proportion of
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the electronics category as a reseller, relative to the books category. High-level data gleaned from
Amazon’s website confirms this prediction. In January 2014, under the category “Books”, Amazon
listed 20,468,847 new books in stock. Amazon is listed as a seller for 11,007,702 of these, so over 50%.
Under the category “Electronics”, Amazon listed 25,851,049 new items in stock. Amazon is listed as
a seller for only 357,283 of these, i.e. just over 1%.
Department stores have traditionally offered cosmetics products through dedicated “counters”
where displays are designed and controlled by individual brands (and sales staff are assigned exclusively
to and trained by specific brands) as in the M -mode, whereas other products (e.g. mass-market
accessories such as watches, scarves, jewelry) are offered on displays controlled by the store and serviced
by generalist sales personnel as in the R-mode. Indeed, cosmetics brands have highly specialized
knowledge about how best to market specific products to consumers, which is hard for stores and their
sales staff to accumulate (Koehn 2002). Such specialized knowledge is less important for mass-market
accessories. Similarly, whereas many electronics manufacturers are content to let Best Buy control
the sale of their products to consumers, Apple, Microsoft and Samsung have recently decided to run
their own mini-stores within Best Buy based on the premise that they have superior information on
how best to pitch their products to consumers. Finally, this tradeoff is also relevant in explaining why
some digital content intermediaries such as Amazon’s Kindle Store, Apple’s iBooks Store, Apple’s App
Store and Google Play have adopted the marketplace mode, in which content or application suppliers
control pricing, end-user licensing and customer support.
Let us now turn to the three other key factors that affect the baseline tradeoff. First, if marketing
activities (or other non-contractible decisions) generate spillovers across products, the reseller-mode
becomes more attractive (see Propositions 2 and 7). This is because a reseller can internalize these
externalities when it exerts its control rights, something that independent suppliers acting in an
uncoordinated fashion cannot do. Thus, it would probably not make sense for BestBuy to allow all of its
suppliers to operate independent mini-stores. Indeed, given the inherent competition between brands
for consumer attention, the result would likely be an over-investment in brand-specific promotional
activities (signage, sales staff, etc.). Spillovers are also an important factor in explaining why cable TV
operators predominately choose to operate in the reseller-mode, extracting more value by coordinating
their pricing and marketing decisions across different channels (e.g. through bundling, and the cross
marketing of different channels).
Second, Propositions 3 and 9 imply that when the reseller has lower marginal costs of handling
additional sales of the same product than the marketplace, the tradeoff between the two modes depends
on the level of demand for each product. The baseline tradeoff is shifted in favor of the marketplace
when the intermediary handles a broad range of long-tail products (e.g. e-Bay, Etsy.com, the Flea
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Market of Saint-Ouen in Paris) and in favor of the reseller when the intermediary is considering a
more focused range of short-tail products (e.g. Eastbay, an online retailer focused mainly on athletic
shoes; Gazelle, an online service that buys and resells used smartphones and tablets, focusing only on
the most popular models).
To specifically illustrate the result in Proposition 9, consider the example of Amazon. Thanks to
its massive infrastructure investments, Amazon has lower variable costs of handling and marketing any
given product on its site than third-party merchants. Therefore, our model predicts Amazon should
sell short-tail products under the R-mode and long-tail products under the M -mode. This prediction
is consistent with descriptions of Amazon’s strategy with respect to third-party sellers. Amazon
oftentimes enters new product categories by allowing third-party merchants to sell the products in
question (marketplace mode). If a product category becomes successful (i.e. if sales exceed a certain
threshold), then Amazon starts selling the relevant products in the reseller mode (see Stone 2013, pp.
303-304). In other words, once Amazon reaches information parity with its sellers, it switches to the
reseller mode in order to exploit its scale advantage.
We have tested this prediction more rigorously using data from Amazon. We extracted the unique
product identifiers and Amazon’s sales ranks in the category “Movies & TV” for all 583,779 DVDs
listed by Amazon under “Movies & TV” which were in stock in early January 2014.10 Amazon does
not disclose exactly how it measures sales rank but it is widely understood that it is a relative measure
of the popularity of items within a given product category (in this case “Movies & TV”) based on
their recent and past sales history. High-selling items have low rankings (i.e. closer to #1) while items
that seldom sell having rankings which can be in the millions. We randomly drew 10,000 product
identifiers and for each of them we recorded whether or not Amazon sold that DVD. Amazon was
listed as a seller for 35.74% of these DVDs. Of the 10,000 sampled DVDs, 2,759 did not have a sales
rank, reflecting they had not had any recent sales on Amazon. Amazon was listed as a seller on only
12.11% of these 2,759 DVDs, a strong indication that it avoids trying to sell “long-tail” (unpopular)
items.
When we included data on items with no sales rank, we set their sales rank equal to one plus
the maximum of the reported sales ranks over the 583,779 DVDs, in order to capture that they are
less popular than the least popular item with recent sales. Measured in this way, the median sales
rank for those DVDs where Amazon is listed as a seller is 355,793. This compares to a median sales
rank of 812,332 for DVDs where Amazon is not listed. Even if we drop items with no sales rank,
the median sales rank for those DVDs where Amazon is listed as a seller is 304,499, compared to a
10Since Amazon only listed the top 9600 items on any search, this required collecting the information by conducting
searches in narrow price ranges. All items can be obtained by combining the results of these different searches.
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Figure 1: CDFs of sales rank for DVDs sold by Amazon and those not sold by Amazon
median sales rank of 540,572 for DVDs where Amazon is not listed. Regardless of how sales ranks are
treated, a two-sided Wilcoxon test of the null hypothesis that two groups (sold by Amazon and not
sold by Amazon) have identical distribution functions against the alternative hypothesis that the two
distribution functions differ in their median easily rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative
that the group in which Amazon sells has lower sales ranks (i.e. more popular products).11
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of sales ranks (i.e. the probability that
sales rank is less than any given number) for each of the two groups. It shows clearly that the DVDs
sold by Amazon (Amazon = 1) take up a much higher proportion of the very popular DVDs and a
much lower proportion of the DVDs with no sales or those that are very unpopular (as indicated by
their sales ranks).
The third key factor we explored was network effects. Specifically, if more suppliers attract more
buyers per supplier, and the marketplace faces unfavorable expectations (a common occurrence for
early-stage marketplace ventures) then the baseline tradeoff is shifted in favor of the reseller. Indeed,
operating as a reseller allows the intermediary to side-step the chicken-and-egg problem which plagues
early-stage marketplaces. Thus, when starting up, intermediaries should consider adopting the reseller
mode, given they are more likely to face a problem of unfavorable expectations initially. Once they
overcome such unfavorable expectations, they can switch to the marketplace-mode. Thus, our analysis
formalizes the discussion of two-sided platforms’ start-up strategies in Hagiu and Eisenmann (2007).
11The p-values are less than 2.2E-16 in both cases, so essentially zero. Note the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is particularly
suitable for this exercise since it is robust to rank data of the type we use here.
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This approach was adopted by Amazon, who initially bought and resold books and other products.
After it established a substantial base of buyers, the company first moved to open up a marketplace
for attracting independent suppliers in 1999, four years after its initial launch (Casadesus-Masanell
and Thaker 2012). By 2011, the marketplace accounted for 30% of unit sales on Amazon.com (Hagiu
and Wright 2013).
7 Conclusions and managerial implications
We have established several fundamental tradeoffs faced by an intermediary when choosing whether
to function more as a marketplace or more as a reseller. We have also discussed some empirical impli-
cations of these tradeoffs. Our model’s predictions have clear managerial implications. To summarize,
intermediaries should choose the marketplace (respectively, reseller) mode for the following types of
products: (1) products for which suppliers have a significant (respectively, a small) information ad-
vantage about the best way to market products relative to the intermediary; (2) products whose prices
and marketing activities have limited (respectively, large) spillovers on other products; (3) long-tail
(respectively, short-tail) products when the marketplace mode has a marginal cost disadvantage (re-
spectively, advantage); and (4) products provided by late stage (respectively, early stage) ventures.
These implications not only apply to an intermediary choosing between positioning itself as a pure
reseller or a pure marketplace, but also to hybrid modes in which the intermediary needs to determine
how many products (and, in the case of heterogenous products, which products) to offer in each mode.
Our analysis has provided a new style of modeling intermediaries’ strategic positioning decisions.
There are many promising directions in which this analysis can be extended. One could generalize our
analysis to allow for multiple non-contractible decisions, such as different types of marketing activities,
store design, customer service, inventory management, returns management, after-sale service, delivery
options, pricing, payment, etc. We could allow the intermediary to take control of some of these
decisions and not others. If different decision variables have different distributions of supplier and
intermediary information, and different degrees of spillovers associated with them, then it is quite
possible that a different type of hybrid mode would arise, with the intermediary controlling some
decisions and leaving others for suppliers to control. Considering all possible combinations of the
allocation of control rights over these different decisions would map out a fine-grained spectrum of
models, from a pure marketplace in which all decisions are controlled by suppliers to a pure reseller
in which all are controlled by the intermediary.
Another important direction for future research is to relax the assumption that buyers must go
through the intermediary in order to reach suppliers. This need not be the case. The possibility of
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disintermediation may be of particular concern under the marketplace mode given that suppliers and
buyers get to interact directly, thereby constraining the level (and type) of fees that the marketplace
can charge, and shifting an intermediary’s choice towards the reseller mode. Related to this point,
one could embed the choice of intermediation mode into a framework in which the intermediary arises
endogenously, in response to some friction (e.g. search costs or transaction costs) from direct trading
between suppliers and buyers. Finally, one could study competing intermediaries, and whether there is
a tendency for different intermediation modes to emerge, possibly in a complementary relationship, or
for one mode to drive out the other. Where different modes do emerge, they could appeal to different
types of suppliers and buyers, and it would be interesting to study which types of suppliers and buyers
are attracted to each mode.
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A Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5
If M can monitor supplier sales and charge a variable fee p in addition to a non-negative fixed fee P , each
individual supplier’s expected profit from joining M is (v − p− f) (m (ne)− Vγ) − F − P . Under unfavorable
expectations P (p) = (v − p− f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F , implying M ’s expected profit is
ΠUEM (p, n) = n (P (p) + p (m (n)− Vγ))
= n ((v − f) (m (1)− Vγ) + p (m (n)−m (1))− F )
if n suppliers participate. Given m (n) > m (1) , ΠUEM (p, n) is strictly increasing in p provided v − p− f > 0 so
that the supplier still wants to sell units and choose the optimal level of marketing activities. Then M optimally
sets the highest possible p such that P ≥ 0. This is
p = v − f − F
m (1)− Vγ .
Note 0 < p < v − f given (14). At this price p, profits are clearly increasing in n so M optimally sets n = N .
Its expected profit is
N
(
(v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− m(N)− Vγ
m (1)− Vγ F
)
which can be compared to R’s expected profit in (5). The comparison gives the expression in (17). The term ρ
in (17) satisfies 0 < ρ < 1 given (14).
Proof of Proposition 8
First, note that it is never optimal to sell any product i ∈ SM in the R-mode if there is at least one product
j ∈ SR sold in the M -mode. Indeed, one could then profitably switch product i to the M -mode and product
j to the R-mode. The only impact on profit would arise from the fact that marketing for j creates spillovers
which the R-mode internalizes while the M -mode does not. This implies that the intermediary should consider
selling some products from SM in the R-mode only if all products in SR are sold in the R-mode.
Second, we show it is never optimal to sell some but not all products from SR in the M -mode. Let S0
denote the set of k ≤ NR products within SR that are sold under the M -mode. Then, for all i ∈ S0, the optimal
choice of marketing is ai = θ + γi + x (NR − k − 1) /2. For all other j, the choice of marketing is aj = θ + δj .
Resulting intermediary profits are
Π (k) = (v − f)
∑
i∈SR\S0
E
[
m−
(
x (NR − k − 1)
2
− δi
)2
+ x
( ∑
j 6=i,j∈SR\S0
(
θ + γj +
x(NR−k−1)
2
)
+
∑
j∈S0 (θ + δj)
)]
+ (v − f)
∑
i∈S0
E
m− γ2i + x
 ∑
j∈SR\S0
(
θ + γj +
x (NR − k − 1)
2
)
+
∑
j 6=i,j∈S0
(θ + δj)

(v − f)
∑
i∈SM
E
m− γ2i + x
 ∑
j∈SR\S0
(
θ + γj +
x (NR − k − 1)
2
)
+
∑
j∈S0
(θ + δj)
−NF
= (v − f)
 (NR − k)
(
Vγ − Vδ − x
2((NR−k)2−1)
4
)
− xNRθ
+N
(
m− Vγ + xNRθ + x
2(NR−k)(NR−k−1)
2
)
−NF.
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This expression is valid for 0 ≤ k ≤ NR.
Suppose there exists k ∈ [1, NR − 1] such that Π (k) ≥ Π (0) and Π (k) ≥ Π (NR). These two inequalities
are equivalent to
Vδ − Vγ ≥ x
2
4
[
2N (2NR − k − 1) + 3NRk − 3N2R − k2 + 1
]
Vδ − Vγ ≤ x
2
4
(NR − k − 1) (2N − 1− (NR − k))
respectively. For both inequalities to hold requires 2NR − k ≥ 2N , which is not possible given NR < N and
k ≥ 0 We have thus shown that selling some (but not all) products from SR in the M -mode is a dominated
strategy.
The other possible strategy to consider is that in addition to the NR products in SR, the intermediary sells
k products from SM in the R-mode, where 0 ≤ k ≤ N −NR. Denote by S0 the set of k products from SM which
are sold under the R-mode. The intermediary chooses marketing activities ai = θ + γi + x (NR + k − 1) /2 for
products i ∈ SR and ai = θ + γi for products i ∈ S0 (the latter create no spillovers). Independent suppliers set
ai = θ + δi for the remaining products i ∈ SM\S0. The intermediary’s profit is therefore
Π (k) = (v − f)
∑
i∈SR
E
m− (x (NR + k − 1)
2
− δi
)2
+ x
∑
j 6=i,j∈SR
(
θ + γj +
x (NR + k − 1)
2
)
+ (v − f)
∑
i∈S0
E
m− δ2i + x ∑
j∈SR
(
θ + γj +
x (NR + k − 1)
2
)
+ (v − f)
∑
i∈SM\S0
E
m− γ2i + x ∑
j∈SR
(
θ + γj +
x (NR + k − 1)
2
)−NF
= (v − f)
(
(NR + k) (Vγ − Vδ) +N (m− Vγ) + xθNR (N − 1)
+x
2
4 NR (NR + k − 1) (2N −NR − k − 1)
)
−NF.
We therefore have
Π (k) ≥ Π (k − 1)⇐⇒ Vδ − Vγ < x
2
4
NR (2 (N −NR) + 1− 2k) .
Note the right hand side of the last inequality is strictly decreasing in k. Thus, there is a unique value of
k∗ that maximizes Π (k) over k ∈ [0, N −NR]. In particular, k∗ = N − NR (i.e. the R-mode) is optimal if
Vδ − Vγ ≤ x24 NR. On the other hand, k∗ = 0 (i.e. only the products in SR are sold in the R-mode) is optimal if
Vδ − Vγ ≥ x
2
4
NR [2 (N −NR)− 1] . (21)
Otherwise, k∗ satisfies the bounds in (18).
The intermediary’s profit is then max {Π (k∗) ,ΠM}, where ΠM is the profit obtained with the M -mode
ΠM = (v − f) [N (m− Vγ) + xθNR (N − 1)]−NF.
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The M -mode yields higher profits than Π (0) if and only if
Vδ − Vγ ≥ x
2
4
(
1−N2R + 2N (NR − 1)
)
. (22)
Since N2R+NR ≥ 2N −1, we have that (22) implies (21). Thus, if ΠM > Π (0) then the M -mode will be chosen.
If on the other hand ΠM ≤ Π (0) then the optimal solution is given by the k∗ characterized above.
Proof of Proposition 10
Compare intermediary profits in (19) with nR products in the R-mode versus nR − 1 products in the R-mode.
Offering nR products in the R-mode is better than offering nR−1 products if and only if 2α (N − nR)+Vγ > Vδ.
Starting from nR = 1, the left-hand side of the inequality is strictly decreasing in nR, so there will be a unique
optimal value of nR for all parameter values. The intermediary’s profit is higher with nR = 0 than with nR = 1
if and only if Vδ > Vγ + 2α (N − 1), which implies the optimal nR is 0. Likewise, the intermediary’s profit is
higher with nR = N than with nR = N − 1 if and only if Vδ < Vγ , which implies the optimal nR is N . The
optimal model is therefore an interior hybrid whenever Vγ < Vδ < Vγ + 2α (N − 1). In this case, the optimal
number n∗R satisfies 2α (N − n∗R) + Vγ > Vδ and 2α (N − (n∗R + 1)) + Vγ < Vδ, so its bounds are determined in
(20).
B Supplementary Appendix
This appendix provides the formal analysis for the various generalizations of Section 5. It shows the robustness
of our benchmark tradeoffs in each case.
B.1 Costly marketing activities
Let us first analyze the benchmark model with the alternative formulation of marketing activities introduced in
Section 5.1 of the paper. We assume throughout that (1) is adjusted to ensure M can obtain a positive profit
in each case, as we did for the different settings in Section 3.
The optimal level of marketing activities chosen by a reseller for each product is
aRi =
(v − f) (θ + γi)
κ
,
implying the reseller’s profit given all products are offered is
ΠR = N
(
(v − f)m+ (v − f)
2 (
θ2 + Vγ
)
κ
− F
)
. (23)
In the case of a marketplace, the result of profit maximization by supplier i is
aMi =
(v − f) (θ + δi)
κ
,
implying a marketplace which can extract full profits from each supplier obtains
ΠM = N
(
(v − f)m+ (v − f)
2 (
θ2 + Vδ
)
κ
− F
)
.
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Comparing ΠM with ΠR, the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if Vδ ≥ Vγ , i.e. exactly the same
result as in Proposition 1 in the main text.
We next introduce the possibility of spillovers, cost differences and network effects.
B.1.1 Cross-product spillovers
Suppose there are spillovers in demand which follow the same linear specification given in Section 3.1. As in
Section 3.1, we assume favorable expectations if x is positive. The reseller’s expected profit at stage 2 is
ΠR (n) = max
a1,a2,..,an

n∑
i=1
ER
(v − f)
m+ 2 (θ + γi + δi) ai + x∑
j 6=i
aj
− κa2i
− nF
 .
This implies
aRi =
(v − f) (2 (θ + γi) + x (n− 1))
2κ
,
and leads to
ΠR = N
(
(v − f)m+ (v − f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vγ + xθ (N − 1) + (N − 1)
2
x2
4
)
− F
)
.
For the M -mode, supplier i’s expected profit at stage 2 is
pii = Ei
(v − f)
m+ 2 (θ + γi + δi) ai + x∑
j 6=i
aj
− κa2i
− F
This implies
aMi =
(v − f) (θ + δi)
κ
and leads to
ΠM = N
(
(v − f)m+ (v − f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ + xθ (N − 1)
)− F) .
Comparing ΠM with ΠR, the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if Vδ > Vγ +
(N−1)2x2
4 , i.e. exactly
the same result as in Proposition 2 in the main text.
With costly marketing activities and cross-product spillovers, the marketplace may do strictly better by
charging variable fees to suppliers instead of just fixed fees (note that without spillovers variable fees are
useless). This is because, unlike in our benchmark specification in the main text, the level of costly marketing
activity chosen depends on the margin obtained by the supplier. By reducing (increasing) the margin through
a variable fee (per unit subsidy), the marketplace can ensure negative (positive) spillovers are internalized, at
least partially. Accordingly, suppose the marketplace can monitor supplier sales and charge variable fee p in
addition to fixed fee P . Supplier i profits at stage 2 are now:
pii = Ei
(v − p− f)
m+ 2 (θ + γi + δi) ai + x∑
j 6=i
aj
− κa2i
 ,
so that
aMi =
(v − p− f) (θ + δi)
κ
.
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With favorable expectations, the marketplace can set:
P = (v − p− f)m+ (v − p− f)
2 (
θ2 + Vδ + θ (N − 1)x
)
κ
− F
in order to extract the entire expected supplier profit from the perspective of stage 1.
The marketplace’s expected profits are then:
N
(
P + p
(
m+
(v − p− f) (2 (θ2 + Vδ)+ θ (N − 1)x)
κ
))
.
Optimizing with respect to p implies:
p∗ = − (v − f) θ (N − 1)x
2 (θ2 + Vδ)
Note the variable fee is positive when the spillover is negative and negative when the spillover is positive. The
resulting marketplace profits are
N
(
(v − f)m+ (v − f)
2 (
2
(
θ2 + Vδ
)
+ θ (N − 1)x)2
4κ (θ2 + Vδ)
− F
)
.
Comparing with the reseller’s profits, we obtain that the M -mode is preferred if and only if:[
θ2 + Vδ − (N − 1)
2
x2
4
]
Vδ
Vδ + θ2
> Vγ .
The left-hand side is increasing in Vδ and θ
2 and decreasing in x2, so the qualitative effects of local information
(Vδ and Vγ) and spillovers (x
2) are the same as before. The condition above can also be written
Vδ > Vγ +
Vδ
Vδ + θ2
(N − 1)2 x2
4
,
which makes it clear that allowing the marketplace to charge variable fees shifts the tradeoff in its favor (as
expected).
B.1.2 Cost differences
Using the profit expressions without spillovers above but allowing the costs f and F to vary by mode, it is easily
verified that the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if:
Vδ ≥ Vγ + κ
(v − fM )2
(m (fM − fR) + FM − FR) +
(
(v − fR)2
(v − fM )2
− 1
)(
θ2 + Vγ
)
.
This condition is similar to that in Proposition 3. The interpretation provided in Proposition 3 and its discussion
still hold.
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B.1.3 Unfavorable expectations
The reseller’s expected profit is still given by expression (23) above (baseline case without spillovers). With
unfavorable expectations, the maximum profit that the marketplace can extract from each supplier is equal to
(v − f)m (1) + (v − f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
)− F .
From N suppliers, the marketplace obtains
N
(
(v − f)m (1) + (v − f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
)− F) .
Thus, the marketplace is better than reseller if and only if
Vδ > Vγ +
κ
v − f (m (N)−m (1)) . (24)
The result is almost identical to that in Proposition 4 except for the additional positive constant term in front
of (m (N)−m (1)).
Let us now allow the marketplace to charge variable fees p in addition to fixed fees. The maximum fixed
fee P that the marketplace can charge is:
(v − p− f)m (1) + (v − p− f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
)− F
so total marketplace profits are
N
(
(v − p− f)m (1) + (v − p− f)
2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
)− F)
+Np
(
m (N) +
2 (v − p− f)2
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
))
= N
(v − f)m (1) + p (m (N)−m (1)) +
(
(v − f)2 − p2
)
κ
(
θ2 + Vδ
)− F
 .
Note the tradeoff involved in choosing the optimal variable fee: a higher p helps better overcome unfavorable
expectations but it leads to lower (sub-optimal) investments in marketing activities. The optimal choice of p is
p∗=
κ (m (N)−m (1))
2 (θ2 + Vδ)
.
To ensure that p∗ is less than v − f , we assume
κ (m (N)−m (1)) < 2 (θ2 + Vδ) (v − f) , (25)
i.e. we require that the network effect be not too strong.
The resulting profit for the marketplace is
N
(
(v − f)m (1) + (v − f)
2 (
θ2 + Vδ
)
κ
+
κ (m (N)−m (1))2
4 (θ2 + Vδ)
− F
)
.
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Comparing this with the reseller’s profit, we obtain that the marketplace is better if and only if
Vδ > Vγ +
κ
v − f (m (N)−m (1))−
κ2 (m (N)−m (1))2
4 (v − f)2 (θ2 + Vδ)
.
Like in the main text, the tradeoff is shifted in favor of the marketplace relative to the tradeoff in (24), i.e.
the case with no variable fees. This shift in the tradeoff is captured by the new negative term on the right hand
side of the inequality. The effect of local information (Vδ and Vγ) is unchanged: the marketplace is more likely
to be preferred when Vγ is smaller and Vδ is larger (the latter is a consequence of assumption 25). Similarly, the
effect of the strength of network effects (m (N)−m (1)) is the same: given (25), the right hand side of the last
inequality above is increasing in m (N) −m (1), so that stronger network effects make the reseller mode more
attractive.
B.2 Supplier bargaining power
Consider first the baseline model. The reseller offers each supplier a wholesale price w so as to extract a share
(1− β) of the expected joint profits created by the supplier’s product (net of the fixed cost F ). Given the optimal
choice of marketing activity is unaffected by the wholesale price, the expected profit generated per supplier is
still (v − f) (m− Vδ)− F .12 Consequently, the reseller sets w so that its expected profit from supplier i is
(v − f − w) (m− Vδ)− F = (1− β) ((v − f) (m− Vδ)− F )
implying
w =
β
m− Vδ ((v − f) (m− Vδ)− F ) .
Applying the same rule for all N suppliers implies the reseller’s profit is
ΠR = N (1− β) ((v − f) (m− Vδ)− F ) .
Similarly, the marketplace sets its fixed fee P to suppliers so as to extract a share (1− β) of the expected
joint profits. Since the supplier’s optimal choice of marketing activity does not depend on the fixed participation
fee, the expected profit generated per supplier is still (v − f) (m− Vγ)−F . Consequently, the marketplace sets
the fixed participation fee P such that
P = (1− β) ((v − f) (m− Vγ)− F ) .
Collecting this from all N suppliers leads to
ΠM = N (1− β) ((v − f) (m− Vγ)− F ) .
Consequently, the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and only if Vδ > Vγ , the same result as in Proposition 1.
It is easily seen that the analysis above also applies to the cases with spillovers (assuming favorable expec-
tations if spillovers are positive) and with cost differences. Thus, Propositions 2 and 3 remain unchanged. The
one setting where things do change is in the scenario with network effects and unfavorable expectations. For
12In the alternative model of marketing activities considered in Section 5.1, the choice of marketing activity would be
affected by the wholesale price paid to suppliers, but this would not change our results since the reseller would do better
to set w = 0 and instead make a fixed payment to each supplier equal to β ((v − f) (m− Vδ)− F ).
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suppliers to join under unfavorable expectations, we must have
P ≤ (v − f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F. (26)
Bargaining creates an additional constraint — the expected equilibrium surplus left to each supplier after paying
the marketplace fixed fee P must be no less than a fraction β of the joint surplus the supplier’s presence is
expected to create in equilibrium ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ). This constraint can be written
P ≤ (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ) .
Thus, M ’s profit is
ΠM = N min {(v − f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F, (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F )} .
Let
β∗ ≡ (v − f) (m (N)−m (1))
(v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F .
Note that (14) ensures 0 < β∗ < 1. There are therefore two cases:
• If β ≥ β∗ then the constraint coming from unfavorable expectations (26) is not binding. Then M can
extract its bargaining share of the expected joint profits
ΠM = N (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ) ,
and the benchmark tradeoff of Proposition 1 is restored.
• If β < β∗ then the binding constraint comes from unfavorable expectations. M ’s profit is
ΠM = N ((v − f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F ) ,
so that the benchmark tradeoff is now shifted in favor of the R-mode, exactly as in Proposition 4.
To conclude, if suppliers’ bargaining power is large then unfavorable expectations are no longer an issue since
each supplier wants to join even if it expects no other suppliers to join. In this case unfavorable expectations
have no effect on the benchmark tradeoff. In particular, if network effects are small (i.e. m (N)−m (1) is small)
then even a small amount of supplier bargaining power can restore the benchmark results. If on the other hand
suppliers do not have much bargaining power, then unfavorable expectations have the same effect as before —
they make the R-mode relatively more attractive.
Suppose now the marketplace can also charge variable fees p. The analysis is similar. Unfavorable expecta-
tions require
P ≤ (v − p− f) (m (1)− Vγ)− F, (27)
while Nash bargaining requires
P + p (m (N)− Vγ) ≤ (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ) . (28)
Again there are two cases. Suppose first that in equilibrium (i.e. at profit-maximizing p and P ) constraint
(27) is binding. Then M ’s expected profit is
N ((v − f) (m (1)− Vγ) + p (m (N)−m (1))− F ) ,
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which is increasing in p. Thus, the marketplace wants to set p as high as possible provided P ≥ 0. This implies
p∗ = v − f − F
m (1)− Vγ .
Assumption (14) ensures 0 < p∗ < v − f . The corresponding profit for M is therefore
N
(
(v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F m (N)− Vγ
m (1)− Vγ
)
.
This compares to the profit N (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ) in case the constraint (28) is binding.
Thus, M ’s profit is
ΠM = N min
{
(v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F m (N)− Vγ
m (1)− Vγ , (1− β) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F )
}
.
Let
β∗∗ ≡ (m (N)−m (1))F
(m (1)− Vγ) ((v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F ) .
Note that (14) ensures 0 < β∗∗ < 1. Again, there are two cases:
• If β ≥ β∗∗ then the constraint coming from unfavorable expectations (27) is not binding. Then M can
extract its bargaining share of the expected joint profits
ΠM = N (1− β) ((v − f) (m− Vγ)− F ) ,
and the benchmark tradeoff of Proposition 1 is restored.
• If β < β∗∗ then the binding constraint comes from unfavorable expectations. M ’s profit is
ΠM = N
(
(v − f) (m (N)− Vγ)− F m (N)− Vγ
m (1)− Vγ
)
,
so that the benchmark tradeoff is now shifted in favor of the R-mode, exactly as in Proposition 5.
Finally, note that (14) implies β∗∗ ≤ β∗. This means that the threshold for supplier bargaining power above
which unfavorable expectations do not matter is lowered when the marketplace can charge variable fees. In
other words, variable fees make unfavorable expectations less likely to constrain the marketplace.
B.3 Downward-sloping supplier demand
Suppose suppliers are heterogeneous in m, i.e. m is distributed on [mL,mH ] with CDF G (.) and corresponding
density g (.), and that the intermediary does not observe each individual supplier’s mi. We also assume:
(v − f) (mL −max (Vγ , Vδ)) > F
so that all products are profitable. Given unobserved heterogeneity in m, it is natural to allow both M and
R to charge fixed and variable fees. Specifically, M charges the fixed fee PM and the variable fee p, while the
reseller charges the fixed fee PR and offers suppliers a bid b per product unit it buys from them.
Consider first the M -mode. A supplier with mi = m participates in the marketplace if and only if
m ≥ m̂ ≡ PM + F
v − f − p + Vγ .
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Thus, M ’s profit is
max
PM ,p
{(PM + pE (m ≥ m̂)) (1−G (m̂))}
= max
m̂,p
{((v − f) (m− Vγ) + p (E (m ≥ m̂)−m)− F ) (1−G (m̂))} .
Clearly the last expression is increasing in p so the optimal p is v − f − ε, with ε being arbitrarily small. We
obtain
ΠM = max
m̂
{((v − f) (E (m ≥ m̂)− Vγ)− F ) (1−G (m̂))} . (29)
Similarly, R’s profit is
max
PR,b
{(PR + (v − f − b) (E (m ≥ m̂)− Vδ)− F ) (1−G (m̂))} ,
where
b (m̂− Vδ)− PR = 0
so that R’s profit can be rewritten as
max
m̂,b
{(b (m̂− Vδ) + (v − f − b) (E (m ≥ m̂)− Vδ)− F ) (1−G (m̂))} .
The last expression is decreasing in b so the optimal b is equal to ε, where ε is arbitrarily close to zero. We
obtain
ΠR = max
m̂
{((v − f) (E (m ≥ m̂)− Vδ)− F ) (1−G (m̂))} . (30)
Comparing the two profits (29) and (30), it is clear that M is preferred to R if and only if Vδ > Vγ , the
same condition as in our benchmark model. It is also straightforward to prove that in the current setting with
no cost differences, an interior hybrid mode is never optimal. This feature also parallels the benchmark model.
B.4 Buyer surplus and affiliation
Assume buyers incur heterogeneous opportunity costs c when joining the intermediary (M or R), where c is
distributed with the CDF D (.). Furthermore, we replace the pricing mechanism in the main text with Nash
bargaining. Specifically, we assume that after joining the intermediary, each buyer engages in Nash bargaining
with the owner of the product i she is interested in. When supplier i sells directly to buyers (in the M -mode),
supplier i’s bargaining power is αM so that the supplier’s and buyer’s payoffs from the interaction are
piM = αM (v − fM ) and sM = (1− αM ) (v − fM ) .
When R sells to buyers, its bargaining power is αR ≥ αM . This captures the fact that R aggregates the
bargaining power of all suppliers. In this case, R’s and the buyer’s payoffs from one product transaction are
piR = αR (v − fR) and sR = (1− αR) (v − fR) .
Since it is assumed fM ≥ fR and αM ≤ αR, we always have piR ≥ piM . On the other hand, it is possible that
sM ≥ sR (i.e. buyers may derive more surplus from their interactions with individual suppliers on M because
they have more relative bargaining power, which may compensate for the higher cost). We also allow M and R
to have different fixed costs, FR and FM respectively, as in Section 3.2.
Finally, to keep things simple, we assume the intermediary cannot charge any fixed fees to buyers for
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affiliation (neither as M nor as R). If this was possible, M may be able to partially offset the inferior bargaining
power of its suppliers relative to R.
The rest of the model is unchanged. Assuming that each buyer is interested in one product only, demand
for product i is now [
m− (ai − a∗i )2
]
D (sM ) if the intermediary behaves as a marketplace[
m− (ai − a∗i )2
]
D (sR) if the intermediary behaves as a reseller.
These expressions suggests that the M -mode now has an additional advantage whenever sM > sR since it
creates more buyer demand as buyers retain more surplus.
With these demand expressions, it is straightforward to derive the profits of M and R (the analysis is almost
identical to the one in Section 3.2), obtaining
ΠR (N) = N (piR (m− Vδ)D (sR)− FR)
ΠM (N) = N (piM (m− Vγ)D (sM )− FM ) .
Taking the difference and re-arranging terms, we obtain that the M -mode is preferred to the R-mode if and
only if
piRD (sR)Vδ > piMD (sM )Vγ +m (piRD (sR)− piMD (sM ))− (FR − FM ) ,
which is similar to the tradeoff including cost differences expressed in (13). The only difference is that (v − fM )
and (v − fR) have been replaced by the more general terms piMD (sM ) and piRD (sR), respectively.
If we eliminate cost differences by setting fR = fM = f and FR = FM = F , then, since m > Vγ by
assumption, the tradeoff is shifted in favor of M relative to the benchmark tradeoff in Proposition 1 if and only
if:
piMD (sM ) > piRD (sR) ,
i.e. if and only if
αM (v − f)D ((1− αM ) (v − f)) > αR (v − f)D ((1− αR) (v − f)) .
This represents a simple tradeoff: the R-mode allows the intermediary to extract more rents out of the buyers
who join, but for this exact reason the M -mode may attract a larger number of buyers.
B.5 Price as the non-contractible decision variable
Suppose there are N products with demand for product i given by
m+ δi + γi − pi + x
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
pj ,
where −1 < x < 1. The demand shock δi is the local information of supplier i and the demand shock γi is the
local information of the intermediary. We assume δi and γi are i.i.d. draws from independent distributions, with
expected values and variances Vδ and Vγ , respectively. All marginal and fixed costs are set to zero for simplicity,
and so there are no cost differences between the two modes, as in Section 3.
R does not observe (δ1, ..., δN ) but can set (p1, ..., pN ) to account for demand spillovers and its local infor-
42
mation (γ1, ..., γN ). It therefore solves
max
p1,...,pN

N∑
i=1
pi
m+ γi − pi + x
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
pj
 .
The first-order condition in pi yields
p∗i =
m+ γi
2
+
x
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
p∗j . (31)
Taking the sum of these conditions over i = 1, .., N , and noting
∑N
i=1
∑
j 6=i p
∗
j = (N − 1)
∑N
i=1 p
∗
i we obtain
N∑
i=1
p∗i =
Nm
2 (1− x) +
∑N
i=1 γi
2 (1− x) . (32)
Subtracting (31) from (32) we can obtain
∑
j 6=i p
∗
j , and substituting this into (31) we obtain
p∗i =
m
2 (1− x) +
a
2
γi +
b
2
∑
j 6=i
γj ,
where the parameters a and b are defined by
a ≡ (N − 1)− (N − 2)x
(N − 1)− (N − 2)x− x2
b =
x
(N − 1)− (N − 2)x− x2 .
From the perspective of the initial stage
ΠR =
N∑
i=1
E [p∗im] + E [p∗i γi]− E [(p∗i )2]+ xN − 1 ∑
j 6=i
E
[
p∗i p
∗
j
] .
We have
E [p∗im] =
m2
2 (1− x) ; E [p
∗
i γi] =
a
2
Vγ
E
[
(p∗i )
2
]
=
m2
4 (1− x)2 +
a2 + (N − 1) b2
4
Vγ
E
[
p∗i p
∗
j
]
=
m2
4 (1− x)2 +
2ab+ (N − 2) b2
4
Vγ .
Plugging these expressions in ΠR above and using the definitions of a and b, we finally obtain
ΠR = N
(
m2
4 (1− x) +
(N − 1− x (N − 2))
4 (1− x) (N − 1 + x)Vγ
)
.
Consider now M ’s problem. It sets a participation fee that extracts the entire expected surplus from each
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supplier. Supplier i sets pi to maximize
pii = pi
m+ δi − pi + x
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Ei [pj ]
 ,
where Ei [pj ] denotes the expectation of pj from the perspective of supplier i. This implies
p∗i =
1
2
δi +
1
2
m+ x
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Ei
[
p∗j
] . (33)
Taking expectations of both sides (and using that Ei (δj) = 0) yields
Ei
[
p∗j
]
=
m
2− x. (34)
Substituting (34) into (33), we obtain
p∗i =
1
2
δi +
m
2− x.
Substituting p∗i into pii and taking expectations, we obtain
pii =
Vδ
4
+
m2
(2− x)2 .
Thus, summing over all N suppliers implies
ΠM = N
(
Vδ
4
+
m2
(2− x)2
)
.
We can now compare the resulting profits under the two intermediation modes by taking the difference. We
obtain
ΠM −ΠR = N
(
Vδ
4
− (N − 1− x (N − 2))
4 (1− x) (N − 1 + x)Vγ −
m2x2
4 (1− x) (2− x)2
)
.
This difference is clearly increasing in Vδ and decreasing in Vγ , so the M -mode is preferred when Vδ is
sufficiently high, whereas the R-mode is preferred when Vγ is sufficiently high. If there are no spillovers so
x = 0, then ΠM −ΠR = N (Vδ − Vγ) /4, so the tradeoff is identical to the one given in Proposition 1. Moreover,
it is easily verified that ΠM −ΠR is decreasing in |x|. Thus, the presence of spillovers unambiguously shifts the
tradeoff in favor of R, regardless of their sign. This result corroborates the one obtained in Proposition 2.
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